MOD 3 - Green Hydrogen Fuel Mix

I Object to this costly fire risk.

I Object to MOD 3 - Green Hydrogen Fuel Mix - MP07_0124-Mod-3 because Hydrogen is very difficult to handle compared to natural gas and diesel. Special provisions will have to be made, people trained and the storage containers are special too - due to the corrosive nature of H2 on steel.
THIS IS A FOOLS’ ERRAND!
YET ANOTHER EXPLOSIVE EXPERIMENT THAT WILL BE YET ANOTHER PUBLIC HEALTH & SAFETY RISK THAT MY FAMILY & I DO NOT CONSENT TO!

This will mean increased costs that we cannot afford as this idiotic, toxic contaminating, Fake Green scandal - which it appears is deliberately sending our economy over a cliff!
IT’S ALL ABOUT RIPPING OFF TAXPAYERS MONEY FOR THE FAKE GREEN RENEWABULL GRIFT & PONZI SCHEME/SCAM - NONE OF WHICH MY FAMILY & I CONSENT TO!
The big question is:- What is the incremental (i.e. cost above straight gas) cost of adding 5 % hydrogen, and secondly where is the economic benefit to the consumer? NONE!
STUPID PLAN!!

This is a mindless, dangerous political decision. The Gov can say "Oh we are using green H2" without saying it’s only 5% and the additional cost is 25% or whatever - on top of straight gas.
What is the cost of the H2 storage and how long before it has to be replaced?
YET ANOTHER FAKE GREEN FANTASY!!

We must have Australian HELE/USCCoal & a Nuclear Power Future instead of brainless experimental, toxic, hazardous Hydrogen, Industrialised Solar/Wind & Filthy Fire Inferno BESS that will kill people!
STOP THESE CRACKPOT THINGS!
STOP THIS RENEWABULL TRANSITION TO EXTINCTION!
THIS IS NOT FOR THE GREATER GOOD!

I Object to MOD 3 - Green Hydrogen Fuel Mix - MP07_0124-Mod-3 to use up to 5% green hydrogen into the fuel mix and construct the associated infrastructure on site because use of hydrogen requires recovery by generation of "green" hydrogen, usually by electrolysis of sea water.
This process is VERY heavy on electric power.

The major component of fuel is gas which is available on demand with no start-up period and obviously no re-charge.
However, I see no benefit of a 5% hydrogen mix added to the gas!

As an engineer, I see a political decision rather than an engineering decision. I see very little advantage in adding only 5% H2 to the fuel, can’t have much effect on the efficiency of the generator. It will simply result in a need to supply more H2 by transport or on site hydrolysis & neither are cheap!

H2 is VERY dangerous and storage is a long tern problem because it hardens steel.

I am a private pilot and have a plane hangared at Shellharbour Airport. I have read the details of the proposed work at Tallawarra Power Station and am concerned for aviation safety as a result of the exhaust gasses that will be emitted from the turbine. I understand that Energy Australia intend to rely on an untested method of estimating the exhaust gas velocity which will be generated by the plant within the circuit area of Shellharbour Airport. I believe that approval to operate the turbine should be with held until all concerned parties are satisfied with the testing procedure and that the resultant velocity of the exhaust gasses is within the parameters set down by CASA.
Shellharbour Airport is primarily a light aircraft aerodrome however some regional passenger transport airlines operate from the airport as well. The light aeroplanes vary from motorised hang gliders to 6 and 8 seat private planes and the parachute plane which carries about 15 people and a large percentage of the air traffic is classified as light sport aviation. These light aeroplanes are very prone to be affected by even light winds so any exhaust gas with a velocity that exceeds the CASA recommended speed could cause catastrophic results to such light air traffic.

I do not have an objection the Tallawarra Power plant extensions but I do strongly object to any proposal that could compromise aviation safety. .
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Please see attached letter from Tony White- SAAA President

The Tallawarra B project is an experiment. No where in the world is there an Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) Power Station in the circuit of an aerodrome with a plume of such ferocity that it needs a plume dispersion device to force the plume horizontally to slow it down enough to hopefully not create a hazard to aviation.
The plume is being assessed using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modelling. This is a first for Australia, with all earlier plume assessments in the circuit of an aerodrome being done using the CSIRO TAPM modelling.
CASA have advised that they do not have the in house expertise to offer comment on the CFD modelling, so they offered to commission a third party peer review of the modelling provided NSW Planning paid for it. That was not followed up by NSW Planning.
The peer reviewed CFD modelling of the Tallawarra B plume shows, under cool, calm met conditions, a plume turning vertical very soon after exiting the plume dispersion device, then accelerating to reach maximum vertical velocity of 10 to 12 m/s at approx 1000 feet AMSL. That plume stays well above 6 m/s up to approximately 2800 feet AMSL.
Energy Australia claim CASA have told them they could halve the CFD peak plume velocity to get the Critical Plume Velocity, and provided that number is less that 6.1 m/s, it would be safe for aviation. Energy Australia have never tabled any formal documentation from CASA to confirm such a claim, and it is nowhere to be found on the NSW Planning Portal.
Replacing natural gas with hydrogen will likely increase the risk to aviation due to a higher volume of plume exhaust gases to achieve the same electrical output.
CFD modelling is very well regarded by the modelling community, and has been shown to model exhaust plume velocities quite accurately overseas. There is no modeller in the world that has documented the need to halve the model result to determine the actual plume velocity.
Plumes overseas have been measured by suitably equipped aircraft, and also by the use of Doppler Lidar, to validate the accuracy of CFD modelling. These validation studies have shown the CFD modelling to be quite accurate. There has not been a validation study anywhere that has identified the CFD modelling to be so inaccurate that its results have to be halved to get the correct answer.
There is an aviation research company in Australia with suitably equipped aircraft to fest fly the actual plume to ensure that it is safe for aviation. They have quoted approximately $110,000 to do sufficient flight testing to validate or otherwise the Energy Australia interpretation of the CFD modelling, and they can validate or otherwise, whether the Tallawarra B plume is actually safe for aviation or not.
There is also a company in Australia that can provide a Doppler Lidat unit capable of monitoring the actual plume 24x7 to ensure Energy Australia are capable of maintaining the plume vertical velocity below 6.1 m/s at all times anywhere at or above 700 feet AMSL, the performance required by CASA to ensure the plume is safe for aviation. Contact details and copies of the quote have been given to the Planning Minister's senior staff.
So, Energy Australia can trial whatever they like within reason, provided NSW Planning require that the actual plume be measured under appropriate conditions, to validate any claims being made by Energy Australia.
Energy Australia should not be granted operational approval for any operation of Tallawarra B that has not been first validated by either the suitably equipped aircraft available in Australia, and/or by third party measurement of the actual plume using Doppler Lidar equipment which is also currently available for purchase or hire in Australia.
CASA have said in writing that the actual plume must be measured to validate that it is safe for aviation, and that the plume must be monitored in an ongoing way to ensure that Energy Australia keeps it safe for aviation. Energy Australia are planning to measure some stack gas and ambient parameters, then use the CFD modelling, including halving the output, to satisfy what CASA have required. That is, Energy Australia are planning to use the model to validate the model, and to validate their very suspicious halving of the output to get the answer needed to satidfy conditon of approval 1.6, which says it must be safe for aviation.
NSW Planning are the authorising body. NSW Planning have a Duty of Care to ensure the safety of all aviators using Shellharbour Airport, and all residents living under the Shellharbour Airport flight path, especially those currently, or in the future, living between Haywards Bay and the Tallawarra B site. To ensure the safety of Shellharbour Airport's aviators and neighbours, NSW Planning must require Energy Australia to have the actual plume measured using the available independent, suitably equipped aircraft, and/or the available Doppler Lidar equipment under every condition that Energy Australia wants operational approval. NSW Planning have a Duty of Care to ensure that Energy Australia prove the actual plume is safe for aviation prior to Energy Australia being granted operational approval for any activity, including the use of hydrogen at whatever level of hydrogen they want approval for.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
John Cleary
President
Illawarra Flyers Aircraft Storage inc

Refer to attached submission

Energy Australia have requested a modification to allow Hydrogen to be added to the fuel mix for the Tallawarra B project currently nearing completion, and located within the circuit area of Shellharbour Airport. It is generally understood that adding Hydrogen will make the exhaust plume hotter and faster, and therefore less safe for aviation. It is therefore imperative that the actual exhaust plume is measured to ensure that the vertical velocity never exceeds 6.1 m/s at 700 feet above ground level (the height of aircraft approaching or departing the airport), as stipulated in the original approval. Energy Australia acknowledge and admit that the plume velocity, before adding Hydrogen, will be approximately double that velocity, at around 12 m/s, according to their own modelling, and acknowledge and admit that the plume velocity will exceed the critical velocity of 6.1 m/s up to around 2,800 feet above ground level, but they claim compliance by halving the modelled velocity. This is clearly erroneous and a manipulation of the data to achieve compliance on paper, so the actual plume must be measured by a third party to demonstrate compliance of never exceeding 6.1 m/s at 700 feet above ground level during commissioning, and must be measured constantly thereafter with LIDAR or similar equipment, to make sure that it is safe as they claim it to be. This measurement and validation must not be carried out by Energy Australia as they clearly have a conflict of interest in trying to mask the actual dangerous plume velocity and make it appear to be compliant, and adding Hydrogen is expected increase the velocity. The lives of aircraft occupants and the lives of inhabitants in the immediate vicinity are at stake here.